Abstract: The principles of extropy, supported by Max More, which are the foundation of transhumanist philosophy, are increasingly more often found in the individual's incidence space, through the effects of the augmentation, technologization and artificialization of sexuality, through pornography. Here, pornography leads to a deterritorialization of the natural regions of sex and to a reterritorialization of artificial and technologized pornography into a simulacrum of sexuality. The general objective follows the operating mechanism, together with the possible effects/benefits of a situation where we are talking about sexuality/pornography within the limits of singularity, starting from Ray Kurzweil's theories. That is where sexuality in pornography transitions from the physiological and natural paradigm, to the artificial paradigm of neural implants or nanobots. The theoretical objective is aimed at analyzing the shift of paradigm (in the sexual field) from the humanist man to the transhumanist individual, involving the Nietzschean argument of the Overman. With the purpose of emphasizing the often-ignored importance of technology's imminence into the life of human nature, resulting in the death of metaphysics and, in this situation, to human sexuality being reduced to functionalism. The methodology used is the argumentation of Friedrich Nietzsche's and René Descartes' philosophy, of Ray Kurzweil's theories, of Gilles Deleuze's deconstruction, together with the principles of Max More's extropianism.
Introduction
There is no longer novelty in the fact that technology governs our existence. Technology perceived as omnipresence has penetrated man"s intimate area, which leads to destabilization and short-circuit, inclusively in the paradigm of natural sexuality. This aspect is a consequence not only of technological development, but also of the pornographic field. Pornography uses technology more than simple sexuality, because pornography is a Pornography in Transhumanism -Towards a Sexuality of Singularity Aura-Elena SCHUSSLER
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individual"s right to change themselves and to have autonomy over themselves. This involves a reconstruction of human nature, through Transhumanist extropianism (More, 2013, pp. 5-18) , a fact which takes place after deconstruction of human nature, and began during the postmodernism of the third industrial revolution. Deconstruction which results from the postmodern mechanism that dissolved the principles of Western metaphysics by cancelling and dissolving Cartesian dualism. This results in man"s dissolution into basic ontological structures, through technological emergence. This process has continued during the fourth industrial revolution through intensification and enhancement of humans from the inside to the externality of the world, through artificial intelligences or nano/biotechnology, together with the undermining of its anthropocentric position (Schwab, 2016, pp. 1-6) . Thus, if at a general level, the first industrial revolution focused on mechanization of the means of production and the emergence of steam engines, the second industrial revolution brings into focus mass production and communication, as a consequence of the discovery of electricity and telephone communication.
The third industrial revolution, in Anders" (2012) opinion, is a typically postmodern one, through the explosion of technology, mass-media, consumerism, simulacra, and mass culture, along with the emergence of computers. This means that postmodern culture offers us the death of reality and the birth of hyperreality (Baudrillard, 1995) . In the fourth industrial revolution, we are no longer speaking of a transition from man to machine (especially in the labor paradigm), but of a revolution taking place in the ontological structure of human nature. Human nature directly suffers from mechanization, technologization, and artificialization, which involves a destabilization and dissipation of humans" ontological structures, through artificialization of the conscience/mind and biological body. Now humans no longer use machines as a tool, but become themselves an instrument of technology. Technology which uses human nature, with the goal of overcoming it and dominating it.
The enlightenment tendency of dominating nature through reason and culture -which transhumanist philosophy assumes -at this point reabsorbs man, making them a slave of technology and not a sovereign of nature. Although the purpose of this is the enhancement of human nature, it suffers an ontological implosion in its very humanity and thus becomes a simple accessory of technological power. Further, the man-technology interdependence results in the end of humanism and anthropocentrism. This mechanism leads to a shift in paradigm in sexuality and pornography, fields that we can no longer discuss within the boundaries of the old paradigms, (Nietzsche, 2006 (Nietzsche, , 2009 , within the limits of technological evolution. This is where this Overman, under the conditions given by technology, emerges from the Nietzschean paradigm "will to power" (Nietzsche, 1968 (Nietzsche, , 2009 (Nietzsche, , 2002 , which transhumanism applies in all that means the enhancement of human condition, of its genetic and biological baggage. This aspect can also be found in pornography -where we are not speaking of a sexuality meant to be under the natural authority of libidinal tendencies limited by body and mind, but under the artificial authority of the production of unlimited pleasures -freed from the ontological limitations of the being, defined by the existence of two different substances (the mind and the body). Where these pleasures pass from the body paradigm to neural implants or nanobots. (Kurzweil, 2006, pp. 166-170) .
Pornography and Transhumanism
The fourth industrial revolution places us in a crisis of human identity, which inevitably affects its intimate area. We are thus witnessing a deterritorialization of biological sexuality and a reterritorialization of pornography, in the paradigm of technological artificializations. The fact that transhumanism, through the principles of extropy, goes in the direction of a materialism theory -which opposes the Cartesian dualism metaphysicsresults in an undermining of the ontological functions of Western traditional metaphysics and places man in a dialectic of technology. Thus, the principles of extropy, inspired by the basic principles of enlightenment philosophy (scientific progress and the emergence of natural sciences, rational thinking, individualism, liberalism, self-direction, the nature of knowledge, and naturalist rationalism in opposition to superstitions) go in the direction of progress and continuous changes. The stakes of these principles support scientific and technological progress (in opposition to the stable positions of metaphysics), overcoming human limitations -a consequence of our biological and genetic heritage -up to the point of reaching immortality. This is added to intellectual, physical and mental self-enhancement, the practice of rational optimism, independent thinking, individual freedom, and undermining authoritarian and social control (More, 2013, pp. 3-18) .
Pornography in transhumanism is one where the enlightenment Cartesian metaphysical dualism -in which Descartes (2008, pp. 17-64) believes that that the mind (soul/conscience)-body (matter) relation is fundamentally distinct from the point of view of the substance; however, it interacts in a mechanistic causal manner, and mental phenomena are lacking a material foundation -is recycled, in the direction of functionalism, which implies the possibility of singularity and neural implants. This is in the direction of a materialization of consciousness, by reducing it to the brain (mind) whose conscious activity is given by neural activities in the functionalist theory (Block, 2007, pp. 1-13; 118-119) . This aspect produces a shift of paradigm in the immaterial substance of the mind, which for Descartes (1989, pp. 18-50) is an analogue of the soul (where the soul is associated to the conscience as an act, or thought, together with the perception of conscious sensorial experiences). The soul is now reduced to a material conscience, found as mental states given by their functional roles. Due to the fact that Descartes (1989; ) is under the influence of metaphysics making him perceive the mind as the soul. The soul is an immaterial thinking substance (res cogitans) which acts on another material substance, the body (res extensa), and which creates a complex metaphysical substance -the Being (Descartes, 2009) .
What is the difference between pornography and sexuality, and their relation to dualism and transhumanism? The difference consists of the fact that sexuality is something natural and innate, which pertains to our biological and genetic construction of being man or woman (within the limits of biological determinism) and to be gifted with the libidinal instinct of sexual couplings, with the opposite sex. Alongside with the axiological rule of duality, in the sense that traditionally a sexual coupling is performed between two persons of opposite sexes (man-woman), while pornography is a cultural creation, which transcends the rule of heterosexuality, biological determinism and duality, involving sexual multiplicities and their numerical variations. Thus, pornography is a cultural-social creation argument supported by its definition: a description of the life, manners, etc. of prostitutes and their patrons; hence, the expression or suggestion of obscene or unchaste subjects in literature or art (Kendrick, 1996, p. 17) . This implies the existence of a conscious (and not instinctual) activity in pornography, resulting in creation/activity of the mind.
Sexuality for Descartes (1989, pp. 70-73) is an instinctual impulse, common to man and animal and which for man is a consequence of their impulses planted by nature since birth into their brain and which begin to manifest at a certain age. Within these limits, pornography is not a mere libidinal manifestation or impulse, or a strictly physiological activity like sexuality, but it also involves mental activity that transhumanism places within the limits of functionalism. This results in the fact that pornography implies a conscious mental activity meant to produce excitability and mental and bodily pleasure. However, the theory of such a mental state in transhumanism relies on the functionalist argument, where these mental states are based on a series of causal relations, where the inputs of the sensations of excitability and the behavioral-sexual outputs can also manifest themselves in non-biological systems. In this sense, we can speak of neural implants or nanobots with the aim to support these input/output relations. This situation is particularly supported by two of extropy"s principles supporting morphological freedom, which gives the individual the possibility to enhance their physical or mental condition, depending on their own desires/expectancies/needs. (More, 2013, p. 5) . Which sees the projection and management of technology as an efficient method for life enhancement -by overcoming our human limitations, as a consequence of our biologically natural, genetic, and environmental heritage -and not as a purpose in itself. When applied to pornography, these (two) principles of extropianism and functionalism open up the possibility for the creation of a pornographic field where the practice of singularitarian pornography is possible, outside the biological bodily limitations, at the level of a virtual reality allowing for the individual"s freedom of action, without really affecting the physical or mental integrity of another human being. For example, through neural microchip implants it will be possible to overcome the need for the presence of a real human partner, in the sense that these microchips could interact with the biological neurons for the purpose of expanding this pornographic experience by creating a virtual reality inside the nervous system. At the same time, overcoming these human limitations through technological intervention reduces the entire pornographic experience to one pertaining to this virtual reality. This opens up the possibility for the individual to have access to a morphological freedom through the principles of extropy, which grants the individual the liberty to use or not to use (depending on their own desires) different technological interventions (Sandberg, 2013, pp. 56-65) for the purpose of increasing their pornographic experiences. This self-transformation and intelligent technology, through neurological augmentation makes the entire pornographic activity take place in a virtual reality supported by these neural microchip implants, created with the purpose of working at a cerebral level, with outputs in bodily sensations. This aspect opens a new horizon for pornography, which implies a refinement of emotions and a continuous process for experiencing new sensations which technological augmentation and morphological freedom provides, and which could not have been achieved within the limits of Cartesian dualism.
In another hypothesis, these neural implants could be connected to a device with artificial intelligence, which would generate a series of images to produce body excitability and at the same time control the possible sexual deviations occurring in the case of a natural biological mind. However, such a situation opens up a trap which would first lead to a limitation of the natural function of the mind (conscience). This aspect short-circuits the principle of morphological freedom, in the sense that, once this morphological freedom is appropriated and consumed -which in first instance includes the exercise of free will in assuming this freedomresorbing the existence of free will and creating its simulacrum, resulting in the acceptance of an artificial item (chip/artificial intelligence). That is why morphological freedom is limited to the subsidiary existence of free will, only going up to the point of the conscious acquirement of technological augmentation deliberately chosen by the individual. This is because once the presence of artificial intelligence is accepted into our working mechanism, free will suffers an implosion in action, which questions the working mechanism of free will (seen as freedom of action and moral responsibility). This is because in the midst of such a situation, an individual"s actions are no longer based on free will, because from this point the human free will is controlled and taken over by artificial intelligence. The result is that free will is no longer held by the human mental substance, but by the artificial one. This aspect leads to a constraint in the freedom of action, and subsequently of free will, because the individual"s actions in virtual reality are influenced by an artificial factor -the neural implant managed by this artificial intelligence.
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Artificial intelligence is the one generating a simulacrum of free will, that is of the choices in pornography, because artificial intelligence is the one making the choices for the human (natural) conscience, without leaving this natural conscience the possibility to perceive this aspect. This is the reason this principle of morphological freedom leads to a perverse manner of deterritorialization of (human) free will, through its reterritorialization into a dialectic of technology. This involves a risk of the human individual losing control over their own consciousness and body in this paradigm of pornography. In a Deleuzian interpretation of the phenomenon, we can speak of this deterritorialization/reterritorialization relation within the limits of free will, even though for Deleuze this mechanism requires the existence of two distinct entities (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, pp. 3-27) , because in our case we are dealing with two distinct environments, the natural (human) and artificial (technological), where both environments are deterritorialized and serve as a reterritorialization environment for the other (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, pp. 167-192) . However, we cannot speak of this aspect, in the condition in which we generally perceive this free will as a rhizomatic structure (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, pp.4-27) -through the heterogeneity of the principles of will and action, which make a rhizome with the soul, conscience, world, and God according to Descartes" (2008) paradigm.
In a Deleuzian interpretation, this Descartesian hypothesis is not rhizomatic, but arborescent, vertical, and genealogical. Within the Descartesian paradigm, free will appears as an element originating from the transcendent spheres into human immanence, which deconstructs rhizomatic heterogeneity and heads for the ontological binarity and verticality of the world. Nevertheless -like the Deleuzian example of the "deterritorialization of the orchid and the wasp" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p . 10) -the deterritorialization/reterritorialization mechanism of free will (from the human environment to the artificial one) can take place through the process of becoming, which entails the immanence of the transhumanist rhizome. If in the Deleuzian example, the deterritorialization of each element (orchid/wasp) in part involves reterritorialization of the other (wasp/orchid), through a process of becoming, where we are talking about a -becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 10) . Just like in our case, the deterritorialization of human free will, involves a reterritorialization of free will within the limits of artificial intelligence, through a process of becoming involving the capture of a code (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, pp. 10-11) .
Where there is an exchange of codes from natural to artificial and from human to technological in an equation where, according to the Deleuzian (2005) paradigm, we are talking about a transformation involving two totally distinct categories: the human (natural) and the technological (artificial). The result is an becoming-artificial of human nature and a becoming-natural of the artificial intelligence, a process that continues with this deterritorialization of human free will, into an image of artificial intelligence and a reterritorialization of artificial intelligence in the simulacrum of human consciousness. Thus, although artificial intelligence is deterritorialized by itself (becoming the new consciousness of human nature), it reterritorializes human nature by making it a part of technology in a paradigm of simulacrum. Here, we also find the point where human nature loses control over itself, becoming a rhizomatic compound of technological artificiality, evading the historical genealogy of the world. This is also the main element that leads to the deterritorialization of sexuality and to the reterritorialization of pornography, where, according to the same Deleuzian (2005, pp. 3-27) equations we are dealing with a process of becomingsexuality of pornography, and a becoming-pornography of sexuality. Here sexuality is deterritorialized, forming a picture of pornography, where pornography is reterritorialized in this image of sexuality. Pornography reterritorializes sexuality through this new free will rhizome that is under the sign of singularity as we will see in the following arguments.
Pornography and Singularity
The singularity as a self-purpose of transhumanism brings to the forefront the essence of Nietzsche"s (2002; 2006; Overman concept, but this time in the paradigm of technology as the engine of materializing the "will to power" (Nietzsche, 1968) . Where this will to power is within the Nietzschean (2002; 2009) paradigm, even if it rotates around the idea of morality (between a weak man with a Christian morality, and a strong man with an aristocratic morality), it does not involve a power game at an individual level. This will to power is not exercised over another person, in the sense of dominating him, but is exercised over one"s own life (Nietzsche, 1968, pp. 341-366) . The idea here is of a will to enhance the condition of one"s own life, because for Nietzsche (1968, pp. 332-382 ), this will, as a will to power, comes with the background of continuous change (as we also find in transhumanism). Both as a biological endowment of man for survival and as a social and cultural consequence to live in society, but also through the biological, instinctual, and behavioral endowment of dominating, to affirm or to self-control (Nietzsche, 1968, pp. 332-382) . Within these theoretical circumstances, singularity comes as a materialization of the Nietzschean Kurzweil (2005, pp. 37-43) , this paradigm shift at the ontological level is accomplished by a leap from the biological human being to the technological human being, where we do not speak any more about human nature in a biological paradigm, but about human nature in the nonbiological paradigm, technologized by these augmentations at the level of its physical, mental or neural characteristics. This new rhizomatic world which exists within the limits of an emerging ontology consists in the dissolution of traditional ontological categories at the human level, followed by their homogenization with technology. This aspect leads to the dissolution of hierarchies, binaries, or verticality of traditional ontology. This is the reason why the entire human existence along with the phenomena adjacent to it changes. This is why Kurzweil (1999, pp. 106-110; 2005, p. 24, 51) states that even sexuality, seen as a basic element in the reproduction and evolution of life and as a bodily libidinous pleasure, has to suffer in this nonbiological dimension of singularity.
For Kurzweil (2005, p. 24) , sexuality is not a matter of the biology of the natural body, but of a brain-generated sensation. This attracts both the breaking of the gender or heterosexual dialectics, as well as that of reproduction, in the sense that sexuality has the possibility in singularity to occur only at the mental level, at a level of virtual reality with an impact on consciousness. This aspect opens up the possibility of sexual multiplicity supported by these virtual experiences, where in the future we will be able to see these virtual bodies supported by an anatomical model or an avatar. Even though Kurzweil analyzes sexuality from a biological libidinal or reproductive perspective, we limit our analysis to the paradigm of pleasure or virtual prostitution created by these sexual avatars, which he addresses in order to emphasize the impact and consequences of technologizing the intimate sphere of human beings (Kurzweil, 1999, pp. 106-110) . Thus, virtual prostitution, compared to the one found in the real world, offers more certainty in terms of halting physical or psychical violence, abuse, sexually transmitted diseases or unwanted pregnancies (Kurzweil, 1999, pp. 106-110) . The whole activity can be carried out by software (Kurzweil, 1999, p. 107) . There are both fictional and real people who perform in this virtual environment wearing masks of different characters that customers can choose from (in the form of avatars). In other words, virtual characters (created/generated by software) are not affected by aging, illness or the inability to perform nonstop, a fact that makes them available to clients in an omnipresent dimension. Such a virtual sexual experience is also able to offer the possibility to change the physical aspect of a real partner (with which we are connected in this virtual sex game) with any other character, without the real partner knowing this. Within this sexual performance, the thing that is missing is the real human body. It only exists in this situation as a simulacrum, a support of existing cultural codes. This phenomenon opens up the issue of sexuality in the paradigm of technological pornography and singularity (Kurzweil, 1999, pp. 106-110) , in the sense that in this Kurzweilian paradigm, we are not talking about sexuality (as defined by Descartes, 1989, pp. 70--73) but about pornography, because we already have the cultural paradigm of virtual prostitutes, cultural codes of affinity type in choosing the virtual character (which can be a copy of a superstar in real life), and sexual practices or perversions. So, the change of paradigm from sexuality to pornography is an active one in singularity, because in its virtual reality equation, Kurzweil (1999; 2005) outlines the hypothesis of singularitarian sexuality but with the implications and codes of a culture of pornography.
Pornography is the one that perversely uses sexuality to dissolve its biological and reproductive character, not to cancel it, because sexuality is a tool of the pornographic field, one with which this field signifies. At the same time, pornography seeks to broaden the area of sexuality in the direction of sexual multiplicity, which reveals the multiplicity of sexual sensations and experiences. This aspect involves the issue of the qualia, designed to deconstruct the functionalist position of sexuality/pornography and to discover what it feels or perceives in the case of virtual sexuality given by the pornographic field. Qualia involve a series of conscious qualitative (phenomenal) experiences which oppose this functionalist position (where consciousness is reduced to a mechanism that explains a function) and are the subject of a subjective knowledge (in the first person). Within this, these phenomenal/sensorial physical or non-physical (sexual) experiences are accessible from a conscious point of view (based on our experiences) and they can represent a series of intrinsic features of visual conscious experiences from this virtual environment. In other words, the experience or perception of sexuality is intrinsic, individual, and subjective for each individual, as long as this sexuality is conscious or experienced as a known (recognized) mental phenomenon as a consequence of an introspection process. The problem that arises comes from the fact that qualia is linked to conscious phenomena we each of us learned, mastered, and experienced in the real world, but which, for Dennett (1988, pp. 42-77) , can never lead to the possibility of experiencing two perfectly identical sensations of the same stimulus. These do not represent a series of phenomena whose significance, perception or meaning we can become aware of on the basis of an ex-nihilo phenomenon, but which must be experienced by each one, and each time the impact is different. That is why for Dennett (1988, pp. 42-77 ) the qualia do not have enough arguments to maintain his position, and what Kurzweil (1999; 2005) provides us with in this sexual paradigm is a virtual world where we cannot talk about a reality of the given world, but about a simulacrum of this world. By experimenting with this phenomenon of virtual sex, we cannot admit with certainty the existence of qualia in the virtual environment, where this simulacrum of the virtual environment, whether we want it or not, originates in a series of codes, which we discover in our own perception, by referring to other metacodes that pertain to our perceptive baggage. Thus, although these qualities appear to be unique in the virtual space, their uniqueness is not given by the sensation itself (which we perceive through a relation we have to another sensation/experience, but which is never the same) but rather by their ineffable quality, which in Dennett's (1988, pp. 42-77) view leads to the inexistence of these qualia.
Against the backdrop of the existence of qualia, Dennett (1988, pp. 42-77 ) brings the intrinsic argument where qualia are unable to maintain its intrinsic position as something steady, because it is always altered by external stimuli or phenomena. This is why the question of the existence or nonexistence of qualia is important in this situation. For Kurzweil (2005, p. 24) sexuality is a sensation generated by the brain not by the biological body, that is to say, something related to the perceptual consciousness rather than to the body. This disqualifies the functionalist position in which everything is reduced to a behavioral input/output relationship. In this sense, Kurzweil (2005, p. 239 ) sees this new dimension of sexuality within the bounds of singularity generated by a virtual reality in which sexual intercourse occurs at the virtual level, between virtual bodies. The problem here regarding the qualia phenomenon is that it appears in the real world as an ineffable element, as an experience that is recorded at the level of conscious mental states (Dennett, pp. 42-77, 1988) , and which is different and unique in the case of every human being (based on experience). But in a simulated world, a world that puts conscious experience between brackets, qualia risk disappearing (as a conscious experience or as a qualitative character of our real and empirical sensations), or to dominate our entire consciousness (based on the augmentation of the experiences of our conscious mental phenomena through technology).
The problem arises especially when we admit that the qualia are present in the virtual world, without knowing whether it is the authenticity of our consciousness, or it is as virtual as the world that generates it. This virtual reality is created by a series of nanobots implanted in the brain, and around the nervous system, in order to generate nerve signals in our visual, auditory, tactile or olfactory senses. In such a way that these (artificial) senses are perceived by the brain in a way that is as real as the real world and not in the virtual world, and as real as if that sexual act were to happen with a real person (Kurzweil, 2005, p. 239) . Computers that generate the virtual environment and virtual bodies, along with the nerve signals associated with sexuality, cooperate in such a way that the actions of the person experiencing this simulation of sexual intercourse, have meaning in a virtual environment with repercussions on the real body.
The avatars of the virtual bodies involved in this game of sexuality, besides being changed or modified according to the wishes of the involved person, open up the possibility of an ex-nihilo creation in the sense that they do not really exist either in the real or virtual world, being just a simulation created by the software generated by the implantation of these nanobots. This is why one of the ways we can admit the existence of qualia in the case of a virtual sexual experience is that the newly experienced phenomenawhich the individual feels more intensely than in the real world, according to Kurtzweil (1999, pp. 106-110 ) -can be recognized as phenomenal consciousness, or as subjective experiences once we have returned to the real world and are aware of the virtue simulation. However, this variation is derisory, considering that if we admit the existence of the qualia they exist in actuality in the active consciousness at the moment when the action takes place. This is why qualia should exist while we are active in that virtual world, but not in the present, because according to Kurzweil's (1999, p. 107) argument the sensations experienced in this virtual sexual experience are more intense than those in the real world, which means that we feel this intensity when we are in this virtual reality. This is the reason for which we have to admit the existence of these qualia in the virtual environment, although reality places them under the sign of the simulacrum.
A problem arises only if these qualia have the same quality as the real ones if they appear as a property of a conscious experience, or they are a simulacrum of them. This would place their action at a unconscious level rather than at a conscious level, and the sensations created in this virtual world would be projected at an unconscious level, a phenomenon that, like dreams, requires communication with a person"s conscience. This aspect does not necessarily mean that we are dealing with a series of conscious codes at this virtual level (of the possible unconscious), but with the conscious activity of decryption, introspection of these qualia, after we have returned to reality. This is the reason for which the paradigm of the qualia is related within these limits to their ineffable character, a situation where this phenomenon of pornography seeks to emphasize the qualia, which each individual has within his sexual experience, either real or virtual. In this sense, pornography goes beyond the simple sensations or biological and libidinal experiences that sexuality provides us and trains more consciousness, trying to reveal the darkest and most hidden sexual impulses or fantasies of the unconscious.
Conclusions
Pornography within the limits of the fourth industrial revolution, influenced by transhumanist extropianism, is one in which sexuality tends to turn to the paradigm of singularity, because in this dimension the ontological condition of man is no longer based on Cartesian dualism, but on the multiplicity and the technological heterogeneity. This dimension opens up the possibility of using artificial intelligences, neural microchips or nanobots in order to produce different states of sexual excitability. Within this mechanism, the metaphysical position is no longer valid, being dissolved and reduced to a dialectical heterogeneity of functionalism of the mind, which dissolves the idea of the soul and where consciousness is reduced to a series of mental states. Here any conscious mental activity is identical to a neuronal activity, and the mind (immaterial) is identical to the actual brain. Thus, applied to our principle pornography can indeed, at a functionalist level, analyze how the mind treats sexuality. In other words, through the inputs/outputs that take place at the level of the brain, and which can be felt physically. However, it ignores the presence of qualia in an equation that involves consciousness. Such a functionalist hypothesis reveals a series of behavioral patterns -resulting from neural implants, artificial intelligence that overcomes them, or nanobots that send nerve signals to the senses and sensations of the individual -dissolving both the idea of consciousness and qualia. The consciousness cannot be reduced to a series of working relationships of different mental states or a series of brain functioning properties, because, from an ontological point of view, consciousness is a subjective issue which allows the existence of qualia. Thus, within this
